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Abstract
This paper investigates a generalized Baron−Ferejohn model with different discount factors,
different recognition probabilities and q−majority rule. In the paper, it is shown that if
players are sufficiently patient, recognition probabilities are similar and the voting rule is not
unanimous, each player's equilibrium payoff is inversely proportional to the ratio of the
player's discount factor to the harmonic mean of all players' discount factors. This result
implies the followings: (i) A less patient player obtains a greater payoff; (ii) As a player
slightly becomes more patient, her payoff becomes smaller; (iii) The equilibrium payoffs do
not depend on recognition probabilities; and (iv) They do not also depend on q.
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Baron and Ferejohn (1989) introduced a sequential bargaining model in which a randomly-selected
proposer oﬀers a proposal, which is put to a vote, and if a majority of players accept it, the game
terminates, and otherwise, the procedure is repeated. Banks and Duggan (2000) generalized the Baron
and Ferejohn model (hereafter B-F model) and showed that there exists an equilibrium in the model.
Eraslan (2002) proved that equilibrium payoﬀs are uniquely determined in a generalized B-F model,
which is a special case of Banks and Duggan’s model.
This paper shows that in a generalized B-F model with diﬀerent discount factors, diﬀerent recogni-
tion probabilities and q-majority rule, which is the same as Eraslan’s model, if players are suﬃciently
patient, recognition probabilities are similar and the voting rule is not unanimous, a player’s equilib-




n, where ±i is the player’s discount factor, H (±) is the harmonic mean
of players’ discount factors, and n is the number of players. This result implies the followings: (i) A
less patient player obtains a greater payoﬀ; (ii) As a player slightly becomes more patient, her payoﬀ
becomes smaller; (iii) The equilibrium payoﬀs do not depend on recognition probabilities; and (iv)
They do not also depend on q.
(i) and (ii) contrast with the result of standard bargaining models, in which more patient players
obtain greater payoﬀs. Under q-majority rule, less patient responders, whose approval seems cheaper,
can belong to winning coalitions with higher probabilities, which is the driving force of (i) and (ii).
On the other hand, it is also shown that under the unanimity rule, more patient players obtain greater
payoﬀs since every responder belongs to winning coalitions with certainty.
The intuition of (iii) is as follows: Under q-majority rule, a player with high recognition probability
(a) belongs to winning coalitions with low probability when she is a responder since her approval seems
expensive but (b) enjoys the agenda-setting power with high probability. (a) and (b) oﬀset each other,
and thus recognition probabilities do not aﬀect equilibrium payoﬀs. On the other hand, under the
unanimity rule, the equilibrium payoﬀs are monotonic with recognition probabilities.
Under larger q, a proposer’s pie is smaller, but a responder belongs to winning coalitions with
higher frequency. (iv) implies that these two eﬀects exactly oﬀset each other.
(i) and (ii) are related to Kawamori (2004), Yildirim (2005), Eraslan (2002) and Harrington (1990).
Kawamori (2004) analyzed a three-player B-F model with diﬀerent discount factors and analytically
computed equilibrium payoﬀs for each discount factor proﬁle in (0;1)
3. The computation implies
that when all players are as patient as each other, equilibrium payoﬀs are decreasing with respect to
discount factors, which implies (i) and (ii) in the three-player model. Yildirim (2005), which generalized
the B-F model by endogenizing recognition probabilities, presented a three-player example in which
equilibrium payoﬀs are not increasing with respect to discount factors in the B-F model with diﬀerent
discount factors (Case 1 in Example 1). Eraslan (2002) showed that discounted equilibrium payoﬀs1
are monotonic with discount factors.2 Harrington (1990) showed that in a generalized B-F model with
diﬀerent risk preferences, if players’ risk preferences are similar and a voting rule is not the unanimity
rule, a more risk-averse player’s probability distribution over her pie induced by an equilibrium ﬁrst-
order stochastically dominates a less risk-averse player’s. (i) and (ii) may also be related to Haan
1A player’s discounted equilibrium payoﬀ is her discount factor times her equilibrium payoﬀ.
2Eraslan stated that equilibrium payoﬀs (not discounted equilibrium payoﬀs) are monotonic with discount factors,
which is, however, false as Kawamori (2004), Yildirim (2005) and this paper imply.
1and Kooreman (2003) and Piccione and Rubinstein (2004), which showed that a seemingly beneﬁcial
property does not necessarily lead to a good result.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes a generalized B-F model, and Section 3
presents results.
2. The model
Consider the following noncooperative bargaining game, which is a generalized B-F model.







k2N pk = 1
ª
, respectively. For ± ´ (±k)k2N 2 ∆, p ´ (pk)k2N 2 P and
q 2 f2;:::;ng, let G(±;p;q) denote an extensive form game deﬁned as follows:






k2N xk = 1
ª
. X is the set of distributions of the one-unit divisible pie. In
each stage game, bargaining proceeds as follows: (i) Nature selects a player i 2 N as a proposer with
probability pi; (ii) The selected proposer i oﬀers a proposal x 2 X; (iii) Every player j, sequentially
according to some predetermined order, votes on the proposal x, i.e., announces either accepting or
rejecting it. Then, if more than q players accept the proposal, the proposal is implemented and the
game ends. Otherwise, the procedure is repeated from (i). Each player’s payoﬀ is the pie distributed
to herself and each player discounts the future pie. That is, player i’s payoﬀ is equal to ±
t¡1
i xi when
x ´ (xk)k2N is implemented at the t-th stage.
In this paper, we use behavior strategies. The equilibrium concept employed in the paper is the
stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE), which is the subgame perfect equilibrium such that
each player takes the same actions in every stage. In this game, there exists an equilibrium3 and
equilibrium payoﬀs are uniquely determined.4 Thus, we can denote player i’s equilibrium payoﬀ of
G(±;p;q) by v±
i (±;p;q) for i 2 N, ± 2 ∆, p 2 P and q 2 f2;:::;ng.
Finally, introduce the following notations: For any family a ´ (ak)k2K, let prk a ´ ak. For any








¢¡1, which is the harmonic mean of a. For m 2 N,
let 1m (0m) be an m-tuple such that prk 1m = 1 (prk 0m = 0) for all k 2 f1;:::;mg. For m 2 N, ² > 0
and a 2 Rm, let Bm
² (a) be an ²-open ball of a on Rm.
3. Results
The following theorem is the main result in this paper. The theorem means that under q-majority
rule (q < n), if every player is suﬃciently patient and all players’ recognition probabilities are similar,
each player’s equilibrium payoﬀ is inversely proportional to the ratio of the player’s discount factor to
the harmonic mean of all players’ discount factors.
Theorem 1. Take any q 2 f2;:::;n ¡ 1g. There exists ²;²0 > 0 such that for all ± ´ (±k)k2N 2
Bn












Remark. Even if “± 2 Bn
² (1n) \ ∆” is replaced with “± 2 Bn
² (±¤1n) \ ∆” for some ±¤ 2 [0;1), the
theorem holds.
3See Banks and Duggan (2000).
4See Eraslan (2002).






n¡1 £ R2n. Deﬁne C1 function f : S ! R2n as follows: For
z ´ (v;u;r¡1;±;p) ´
³
(vk)k2N ;u;(rk)k2Nnf1g ;(±k)k2N ;(pk)k2N
´
, for i 2 N,
pri f (z) = vi ¡ pi f1 ¡ (q ¡ 1)ug ¡
(






pri+n f (z) = ±ivi ¡ u;
where r1 ´ 1












. Obviously, f (z¤) = 02n holds
and the derivative of f (z) with respect to (v;u;r¡1) evaluated at z = z¤ is a full rank matrix. Thus, the
Implicit Function Theorem implies that there exists ¯ ² > 0 and C1 function g : B2n
¯ ² (±¤;p¤) ! R2n such






= g (±¤;p¤) and f (g (±;p);±;p) = 02n
for all (±;p) 2 B2n
¯ ² (±¤;p¤). Let ˆ vi (±;p) ´ pri g (±;p) for i 2 N, ˆ u(±;p) ´ prn+1 g (±;p), ˆ ri (±;p) ´
pri+n g (±;p) for i 2 N n f1g and ˆ r1 (±;p) ´ 1
2, for (±;p) 2 B2n
¯ ² (±¤;p¤). Note that ˆ r1 (±;p) = r1.
Consider ² and ²0 such that Bn
² (±¤) £ Bn
²0 (p¤) ½ B2n
¯ ² (±¤;p¤). Take any ± 2 Bn
² (±¤) \ ∆ and
p 2 Bn
²0 (p¤) \ P. Consider strategy proﬁle ¾ deﬁned as follows:





1 ¡ (q ¡ 1) ˆ u(±;p) if k = i
ˆ u(±;p) if k 2 fi ¡ 1;i ¡ 3;:::;i ¡ qg
0 otherwise








1 ¡ (q ¡ 1) ˆ u(±;p) if k = i
ˆ u(±;p) if k 2 fi ¡ 2;i ¡ 3;:::;i ¡ qg
0 otherwise
with probability 1 ¡ ˆ ri (±;p).
² Every player i accepts a proposal (yk)k2N with probability 1 if yi ¸ ˆ u(±;p) and rejects it other-
wise.
Let Vi be player i’s payoﬀ by ¾. Then,
Vi = pi f1 ¡ (q ¡ 1) ˆ u(±;p)g +
(






For i 2 N, Vi = ˆ vi (±;p) since pri f (g (±;p);±;p) = 0. Notice that pri+n f (g (±;p);±;p) = 0 for all
i 2 N. Then, ±iVi = ±iˆ vi (±;p) = ˆ u(±;p). Consider the unimprovability of player i’s strategy of
¾. Obviously, player i’s voting action of ¾ is unimprovable. Consider player i’s proposing action.
Player i’s proposal of ¾ is obviously optimal among proposals to pass given voting actions of ¾.
5For i;j 2 Z, on indices representing players, we regard i as identical with j if i ´ j (mod n).
3Player i, at her proposing nodes, obtains a payoﬀ of 1 ¡ (q ¡ 1) ˆ u(±;p) by the proposal of ¾ and a
payoﬀ of ±iVi = ˆ u(±;p) by proposals not to pass given voting actions of ¾. The former is greater
than the latter since ˆ u(±;p) < 1
q. Thus, player i’s proposing action of ¾ is unimprovable. Since i
is arbitrary, ¾ is unimprovable. Hence, the One Deviation Principle implies that ¾ is an SPE. ¾ is
obviously stationary. Therefore, ¾ is an SSPE. Notice that
P










n. Since ¾ is an SSPE,
v±





The theorem implies the following four corollaries under similar discount factors and recognition
probabilities.
The ﬁrst corollary says that a less patient player’s equilibrium payoﬀ is greater than a more patient
player’s.
Corollary 1. Take any q 2 f2;:::;n ¡ 1g. There exists ²;²0 > 0 such that for all ± ´ (±k)k2N 2
Bn






\ P, for all i;j 2 N, v±
i (±;p;q) R v±
j (±;p;q) if and only if ±i Q ±j.
The second corollary says that as a player becomes slightly more patient, the player’s equilibrium
payoﬀ decreases.
Corollary 2. Take any q 2 f2;:::;n ¡ 1g. There exists ²;²0 > 0 such that for all ± ´ (±k)k2N 2
Bn










In standard bargaining games, a more patient player has a stronger bargaining power and thus
obtains a larger payoﬀ, which contrasts with Corollaries 1 and 2. In the Baron-Ferejohn model with
q-majority rule (q < n), a proposer can make a proposal pass by distributing only q ¡ 1 responders
their continuation payoﬀs respectively and winning their approval. Thus, the proposer wants to form
winning coalitions with responders who seem to obtain small continuation values. Therefore, less
patient responders can belong to winning coalitions with higher probabilities, which is the driving
force of Corollaries 1 and 2.







and q = 2. Take any ± ´ (±k)k2N 2 (0;1)
3
such that ±i ¸ 2
3 for all i 2 N. Then, consider game G(±;p;q). In this game, the following strategy
proﬁle is an SSPE:
² Every player i proposes (xk)k2N such that xi ´ 1¡
H(±)
3 , xi+1 ´
H(±)




2 2 (0;1), and (x0
k)k2N such that x0
i = 1 ¡
H(±)
3 , x0




probability 1 ¡ ri.
² Every player i accepts a proposal (yk)k2N with probability 1 if yi ¸
H(±)
3 and rejects it with
probability 1 otherwise.
Note that ri is the probability that player i+1 belongs to winning coalitions when player i is a proposer
and the probability is decreasing in player i + 1’s discount factor. Player i’s equilibrium payoﬀ Vi is


















4On the other hand, if q = n, all responders’ approval is necessary for a proposal to pass. Thus,
every responder, however patient she is, can be distributed her continuation value. Therefore, less
patient players have no advantage and obtain smaller payoﬀs. Indeed, for any ± ´ (±k)k2N 2 ∆





n,6 which implies that under the same recognition probability, v±
i (±;p;n) R v±
j (±;p;n)
if and only if ±i R ±j.
The third corollary says that the equilibrium payoﬀs are determined independent of recognition
probabilities.
Corollary 3. Take any q 2 f2;:::;n ¡ 1g. There exists ²;²0 > 0 such that for all ± 2 Bn
² (1n) \ ∆






\ P, for all i 2 N, v±
i (±;p;q) = v±
i (±;p0;q).
Each player’s recognition probability has two eﬀects on her equilibrium payoﬀ, between which there
is a tradeoﬀ, under q-majority rule (q < n). One is that a player with high recognition probability
belongs to winning coalitions with low probability when she is a responder since her approval seems
expensive. The other is that a player with high recognition probability enjoys the agenda-setting
power with high probability. These two eﬀects oﬀset each other and thus recognition probabilities do
not aﬀect equilibrium payoﬀs.7 On the other hand, as calculated above, under the unanimity rule,
the equilibrium payoﬀs are monotonic with recognition probabilities. This is because the ﬁrst eﬀect
vanishes under the unanimity rule.
The fourth corollary says that the equilibrium payoﬀs are determined independent of voting rules.
Corollary 4. Take any q;q0 2 f2;:::;n ¡ 1g. There exists ²;²0 > 0 such that for all ± 2 Bn
² (1n) \ ∆






\ P, for all i 2 N, v±
i (±;p;q) = v±
i (±;p;q0).
Under larger q, a proposer’s pie is smaller, but a responder belongs to winning coalitions with
higher frequency. The corollary implies that these two eﬀects exactly oﬀset each other.
Finally, we remark on some possible extensions: (i) Since players’ discount factors signiﬁcantly
aﬀect equilibrium payoﬀs, each player may want to decide her own patience endogenously. Therefore,
it is necessary to endogenize discount factors. (ii) It is natural that a player does not know how patient
the other players are. Therefore, treating a player’s discount factor as her private information is a
more realistic approach.
6v±
i (±;p;n) is also written as v±
i (±;p;n) =
Hp((1¡±k)k2N)




is the harmonic mean of
(1 ¡ ±k)k2N weighted by p.
7The two eﬀects completely oﬀset each other. The reason is as follows: Consider the case that every player has
the same discount factor. Let each player’s recognition probability be 1
n. Then, let player 1’s recognition probability
marginally increase and the other players’ uniformly decrease. Suppose that player 1’s equilibrium payoﬀ increases by
the change of recognition probabilities. Then, player 1 belongs to winning coalitions with probability 0 when she is
not a proposer. Thus, the former eﬀect discontinuously decreases her payoﬀ. On the other hand, the latter eﬀect just
marginally increases her payoﬀ. Hence, player 1’s payoﬀ must decrease, which is a contradiction. Suppose that player
1’s equilibrium payoﬀ decreases by the change of recognition probabilities. Then, player 1 belongs to winning coalitions
with probability 1 when she is not a proposer. Thus, the former eﬀect increases her payoﬀ. On the other hand, the
latter eﬀect also increases her payoﬀ. Hence, player 1’s payoﬀ must increase, which is a contradiction. Therefore, the
change of recognition probabilities must not aﬀect player 1’s equilibrium payoﬀ.
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